

## CHAPTER THIRTEEN: SECURITY RISK ASSESSMENT

### 13.1 INTRODUCTION

This Chapter of the report presents the findings of the Security Risk Assessment, conducted by former SAPS Lieutenant Colonel, Mr Rodney Visser, who has a National Diploma in Police Administration, holds University endorsed qualifications in Organized Crime and Police Management and has vast training qualifications by both US and UK Law Enforcement Agencies. This chapter includes the evaluation of potential elevated security risk posed by the proposed development on rhino and exotic game in the area.

### 13.2 SPECIALIST TERMS OF REFERENCE

The Security Risk Assessment to include:

- The assessment of potential security risks which the development may pose during the construction and operational phase of the project, with regards to increased poaching, as a result of increased activity on the farm.
- The assessment of and comment on suitable buffers or other mitigation measures to minimise potential security risks associated with poaching, as well as stray bullets from neighbouring game farms.
- The provision of measures to mitigate/ reduce potential increased security risks.
- The provision of measures/ recommendations for inclusion in the EMP with regards to minimizing security risk during the Construction and Operational Phases of the proposed development.

### 13.3 SECTION A: CURRENT CRIME THREAT

#### 13.3.1 Relevant Crime Statistics

The proposed development (hereafter referred to as Ikamva Lethu), falls within the policing precinct of the Addo South African Police Service which is situated approximately ten kilometres away. In the interest of transparency and objectivity, statistics of the Kirkwood policing precinct will also be considered.

South African crime statistics, which are released by Statistics SA annually, during September / October, do not specify illegal hunting or game theft per se. The following statistics are, however, closely related and available (Table 13.1).

*Table 13.1: South African crime statistics relevant to both the Addo, as well as the Kirkwood police precincts.*

2016	ADDO	KIRKWOOD	TOTAL
Stock Theft	21	27	48
Rhino Poaching	0	0	0

A total of nineteen (19) rhino were killed in the Eastern Cape Province during 2016, while eleven (11) rhino were killed in the Eastern Cape since 2017 and counting (Figure 13.1).

Although no rhinos were lost due to poaching in the Addo and Kirkwood precincts during the previous four (4) years, the phenomena and threat are real.




Figure 13.1: Eastern Cape annual rhino poaching statistics.

### 13.3.2 Law Enforcement

*Pro-Active:* The current official pro-active policing structure is SAPS in the form of visible policing, road blocks and rural safety operations.

*Reactive:* Reactively, the Stock Theft and Endangered Species Unit situated in nearby Uitenhage, investigate all reported illegal hunting, stock theft and rhino poaching cases. The Unit Commander is Captain G du Randt.

The South African reality dictates that abovementioned government structures are augmented by actors in the private security industry.

## 13.4 SECTION B: CONCERNS BY INTERESTED AND AFFECTED PARTY

- Concerns submitted by Attorney J Vosloo, on behalf of their client Mr. D van der Westhuizen (email dated 20 February 2017 refers).
  - This report will deal with paragraph two (rhino security), paragraph three (risk of stray bullets injuring persons on the proposed development property), and paragraph five (general security with regards to exotic animals owned by Mr van der Westhuizen).

### 13.4.1 Rhino and Exotic Game Security (paragraph two and five)

The threat of rhino poaching is a reality in South Africa and the Eastern Cape, which forms part of the National criminal landscape. A positive statistic and reality, however, is that rhino poaching in the Eastern Cape amounted to only 1,8% of the national poaching losses during 2016. Previous years were even less.

A contributing factor which will limit rhino poaching in the Eastern Cape, is that the Province only hosts 2% of the National rhino population.

The risk profile in the Eastern Cape is, therefore, significantly less compared to Provinces with denser rhino populations.

Abovementioned does not, however, nullify fears and poaching concerns, but rather contextualizes it.

### 13.5 FACTORS INFLUENCING POACHING THREAT OR POACHING PROBABILITY

- Vegetation serving as concealment to poachers;
- Proximity of reserve to roads (escape routes);
- Weather;
- Astronomical conditions (moon phase, natural illumination);
- Distance of rhino from points of entry into reserve;
- Location of waterholes, middens, mud wallows;
- Topography – vantage points;
- Interior security measures in place (Anti-Poaching capacity);
- Knowledge of rhino locations by the public, employees, criminals;
- Previous or current criminal activity near entry points/ fences;
- Terrain – is terrain conducive to successful infiltration/ exfiltration by poachers;
- Availability of grazing;
- Perceived risk of detection by poachers;
- Crime patterns;
- Human activity/ settlements in proximity to target area;
- External policing or lack thereof;
- Availability of crime intelligence;
- Activity or criminal strongholds in precinct.

It is reasonable to assume that if Mr van der Westhuizen keeps rhino on his property, a risk of poaching already exists. The question at hand is thus : *Will the proposed development on the Remainder of Farm 654 (Ikamva Lethu Farms Pty Ltd) increase the risk of poaching and if so, to what extent?*

The factors mentioned above are not exhaustive, but it will play a pivotal role in the rhino security of Mr. van der Westhuizen's property, *whether the proposed development proceeds or not.*

Attorney Vosloo, on instruction of Mr. van der Westhuizen, tabled a concern that Ikamva Lethu staff members *may* increase the risk of poaching during the development phase *if they see rhino or exotic game*. Of the eighteen (18) factors influencing poaching, the fact that only one factor *may* change namely, the possibility of Ikamva Lethu staff seeing rhino or exotic game, does not automatically elevate the poaching risk.

For this specific factor to come into play and become relevant, the following elements must manifest:

- We must assume that some Ikamva Lethu employees/ contractors are criminally inclined;
- Have access to instruments to poach namely rifle, ammunition, etc.;
- Have opportunity i.e. access to the property where rhino/ game are kept;
- Have motive;
- Be reasonably sure that their actions will go unnoticed or undetected.

One cannot unequivocally reason or deduce, neither inductive nor deductive that *if* workers see rhino or exotic game, that they will steal, hunt or harm the animals. To do so would be anecdotal.

### 13.6 OBSERVATIONS

During the site visit, the following was established:

- Two (2) of the proposed Ikamva Lethu development's fence lines border Mr. van der Westhuizen's property. The fence line bordering Farm 4/ 632 is ~1.6km in distance, while the fence line

bordering Farm 83/ 558 is ~1.1km in distance. The total distance of fence line which may be impacted on is thus ~2.7km.

- Two (2) hunting towers, both situated a few hundred meters (estimated at ~600m) from both above-mentioned fence lines, were observed.
- Vegetation on Ikamva Lethu is such that Mr. van der Westhuizen's fence line is invisible 90% of the time, if viewed from 200m away. There is at least one (1) site where Mr. van der Westhuizen's fence line is visible from ~300 meters, but with plain unaided eyesight the view is tainted.
- Topographically, Ikamva Lethu is lower and sloping away from Mr. van der Westhuizen property as correctly stated by Attorney Vosloo. This fact makes it hard and mostly impossible to see Mr. van der Westhuizen's property from 200m away.
- No rhino, rhino middens or waterholes could be seen near the above-mentioned fences.

### **13.7 THE HUMAN FACTOR**

It is of vital importance to be mindful that no employees will be living on the north-western portion of Ikamva Lethu. The fact that employees will have no after hour access to the concerned communal area with Mr. van der Westhuizen, largely eliminates opportunity for employees to get up to mischief.

It is foreseen that local contractors and community will be utilized as the workforce during both the development and production phases of Ikamva Lethu. The workforce will be managed and closely supervised which will further minimize security risk, if any. Further, it can be argued that it is local knowledge that Mr. van der Westhuizen keeps rhino and exotic animals, therefore, it would not be new information to any local workforce. A workforce, and specifically its propensity to commit crime, can be managed with confidence by skilled security and human resource staff. Dynamic and static factors amongst staff and contractors, both internal and external, can be successfully monitored, mitigated and managed.

It is estimated that 62 seasonal employment opportunities and 10 permanent administrative opportunities will be created by the proposed project. It is proposed that a maximum of 5 permanent employees are housed within existing buildings south of the MR00470 which bisects the proposed Ikamva Lethu development. The 10-administrative staff will be accommodated during work hours, 08h00 to 17h00, within existing structures on a central portion of Ikamva Lethu, south of the MR00470. The closest existing structure proposed to accommodate staff (administrative) is ~1.5km east of the closest boundary of Mr van der Westhuizen's property, Farm 4/ 632.

Seasonal and project workforce do bring about an increased security risk in the form of predominantly socio-economic contact crimes. A responsible employer can, however, with relative ease proactively address any challenge in this regard by supplying proper living arrangements, social support and recreation facilities, for employees living on the site, as outlined above. The 62-seasonal staff will be transported to and from the farm daily leaving no staff on the north-western portion of Ikamva Lethu during the evening when poaching crime mostly occurs.

### **13.8 SECURITY PROPOSAL**

#### **Buffer Zone**

The buffer zone adjacent to Mr van der Westhuizen's property (Farm 4/632 and 83/558), which has been determined as a result of biodiversity constraints (e.g. soil suitability, vegetation conservation, aquatic buffers), will serve as an adequate early detection zone (EDZ) and in addition will hinder sight into Mr. van der Westhuizen's property. In line with the biodiversity constraints, this buffer zone will be at a minimum of 300m wide. The natural vegetation and topography on or near the communal boundaries with Mr. van der Westhuizen's property forms a virtual buffer zone (similar to Figure 13.2 and 13.3).

While it is not a required recommendation of this report to erect additional fences, it is noted that Ikamva Lethu will fence in the developed portion of their site, in order to secure their product.

The buffer zone will not be implemented as a precaution against stray bullets *as that should and must never happen*. In line with the biodiversity constraints and recommendations of the various specialists, access to the buffer zone should be restricted. Warning signs should be strategically posted on the inner perimeter of proposed buffer zone to indicate to staff that access to this area is restricted. See example below:

**WARNING: AUTHORISED PERSONELL ONLY, BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION AREA**



Figure 13.2: Google earth aerial image depicting natural buffer zones at a farm in the vicinity.



Figure 13.3: A similar, buffer zone visible on the western fence line of Mr. van der Westhuizen's property.

### 13.9 SECURITY STRATEGY – IKAMVA LETHU

Goal: To manage and minimize all security threats during the development and production phase of Ikamva Lethu.

#### 13.10 SECURITY STRATEGY PROPOSAL

	<b>ACTION STEPS</b>	<b>IMPLEMENTATION DATE</b>
1.	Vetting of all new employees/ contractors.	Prior to commencement of employment – March 2019 – Phase 1
1.1.	All new employees to complete pre-employment security questionnaire.	To be repeated with new employees/ contractors.
1.1.1.	Questionnaire processing and capturing on database. Filing of identity document copies.	Sept 2019 Jan 2020 Aug 2019 <b>Phase 2</b> March 2020 Sept 2020 Jan 2021
1.2.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Applicants with elevated risk profile to be identified pre- employment.</li> <li>• Criminal vetting</li> </ul>	
2.	Security induction meeting with all new employees/ contractors and sign-off of induction. Hard copy of	1 April 2019 for Phase 1 and thereafter to any new group commencing employment.
2.1.	Ikamva Lethu site security procedure issued to every employee/ contractor.	
3.	Random visible security presence in buffer zone. At least once a week including sweeping operations of fence for snaring and signs of human activity.	Commence April 2019
4.	Enhanced/ elevated communication with security providers and plug into existing crime information systems and pre-warning alerts with regards to poaching suspect activity/ movement.	From commencement of development
5.	Any security breach/ compromise to be investigated swiftly and dealt with decisively.	As incidents occur
6.	Permanent on site – Security Supervisor with vehicle to facilitate and conduct abovementioned actions 1 – 5.	Commence April 2019