

APPENDIX K: SECURITY RISK ASSESSMENT

SECURITY RISK ASSESSMENT

Ikamva Lethu Farms (Pty) Ltd



Compiled by Rodney Visser

25 October 2017

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report deals with the alleged elevated security risk which the proposed Ikamva Lethu development may pose to an interested and affected party (I&AP), Mr. D van der Westhuizen.

After evaluation of the concerns raised by the I&AP, with regards to elevated rhino and exotic game security, my finding is that the risk elevation is **MINOR** due to the following reasons:

- a) It is unlikely that rhino inhabit the area within sight of the Ikamva Lethu fence lines as hunting of game is taking place in the area.
 - Rhino/ exotic game will be traumatized by high velocity rifle fire.
 - Rhino/ exotic game (high value species) will be at risk of being wounded/ killed by hunters if they roam the area adjacent to the communal fence line with Ikamva Lethu.
 - The only risk factor, namely possible sight of high value species by Ikamva Lethu workforce, is anecdotal, but will be mitigated by a restricted access natural buffer area.
- b) The “stray bullet” concern must not be an issue as no hunting may take place if any risk of damage to property or human life exists.
- c) General security concerns will be adequately mitigated by the security strategy proposed.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGE
1. INTRODUCTION	1
2. SECTION A: CURRENT CRIME THREAT	1
2.1. Crime Statistics: Relevant	1
2.2. Law Enforcement	2
3. SECTION B: CONCERNS BY INTERESTED AND AFFECTED PARTY	2
4. FACTORS INFLUENCING POACHING THREAT OR POACHING PROBABILITY	3
5. OBSERVATIONS	4
6. THE HUMAN FACTOR	4
7. STRAY BULLETS (Paragraph 3)	5
8. SECURITY PROPOSAL	5
9. SECURITY STRATEGY – IKAMVA LETHU	7
10. SECURITY STRATEGY PROPOSAL	7

1. INTRODUCTION

This risk assessment is being compiled for Mr. Ken Niewenhuizen, Director – Transformation and Development, Sundays River Citrus Company (Pty) Ltd, as part of the Environmental Impact Assessment, in order to establish an Agricultural Development (Ikamva Lethu) on the Remainder of Farm 653, Sunland, Sundays River Valley Municipality.

The scope of work includes, inter alia, an assessment of security risks which the proposed establishment of a citrus farm (Ikamva Lethu) may pose to the business operation and interests of Mr. D S van der Westhuizen, a neighboring business owner and duly registered interested and affected party (I&AP).

Thanks to Sandra Wren and Marisa Jacoby (Public Process Consultants) and Frikkie Olivier (SRCC) for providing the information required.

This report was compiled by Rodney Visser, a former SAPS Lieutenant Colonel, who has a National Diploma in Police Administration, holds University endorsed qualifications in Organized Crime and Police Management and has vast training qualifications by both US and UK Law Enforcement Agencies, i.e. FBI, SOCA and DEA.

2. SECTION A: CURRENT CRIME THREAT

2.1. Crime Statistics: Relevant


The proposed development (hereafter referred to as Ikamva Lethu), falls within the policing precinct of the Addo South African Police Service which is situated approximately ten kilometers away. In the interest of transparency and objectivity, statistics of the Kirkwood policing precinct will also be considered.

South African crime statistics, which are released by Statistics SA annually during September/October, do not specify illegal hunting or game theft per se. The following statistics are, however, closely related and available.

2016	ADDO	KIRKWOOD	TOTAL
Stock Theft	21	27	48
Rhino Poaching	0	0	0

A total of nineteen (19) rhino were killed in the Eastern Cape Province during 2016, while Eleven (11) rhino were killed in the Eastern Cape for 2017 year to date.

Although no rhino was lost due to poaching in the Addo and Kirkwood precincts during the previous four (4) years, the phenomena and threat are real.



2.2. Law Enforcement

Pro-Active: The current official pro-active policing structure is SAPS in the form of visible policing, road blocks and rural safety operations.

Reactive: Reactively the Stock Theft and Endangered Species Unit situated in nearby Uitenhage investigate all reported illegal hunting, stock theft and rhino poaching cases. Unit Commander is Captain G du Randt - cellular: 082 9589 099.

The South African reality dictates that abovementioned government structures are augmented by actors in the private security industry.

3. SECTION B: CONCERNS BY INTERESTED AND AFFECTED PARTY

3.1. Concerns submitted by Attorney J Vosloo on behalf of their client Mr. D van der Westhuizen (email dated 20 February 2017 refers).

3.1.1. This report will deal with paragraph 2 (rhino security), paragraph 3 (risk of stray bullets injuring persons on proposed Ikamva Lethu). Paragraph 5 General Security with regards to exotic animals owned by Mr van der Westhuizen.

3.2. Rhino and exotic game security (paragraph 2 & 5)

The threat of rhino poaching is a reality in South Africa and the Eastern Cape forms part of the National criminal landscape. A positive statistic and reality, however, is that rhino poaching in the Eastern Cape amounted to only 1,8% of the national poaching losses during 2016. Previous years were even less.

A contributing factor which will limit rhino poaching in the Eastern Cape is that the Province only hosts 2% of the National rhino population.

The risk profile in the Eastern Cape is, therefore, significantly less compared to Provinces with denser rhino populations.

Abovementioned does not, however, nullify fears and poaching concerns, but rather contextualizes it.

4. FACTORS INFLUENCING POACHING THREAT OR POACHING PROBABILITY

- Vegetation serving as concealment to poachers;
- Proximity of reserve to roads (escape routes);
- Weather;
- Astronomical conditions (moon phase, natural illumination);
- Distance of rhino from points of entry into reserve;
- Location of waterholes, middens, mud wallows;
- Topography – vantage points;
- Interior security measures in place (Anti-Poaching capacity);
- Knowledge of rhino locations by the public, employees, criminals;
- Previous or current criminal activity near entry points/ fences;
- Terrain – is terrain conducive to successful infiltration/ exfiltration by poachers;
- Availability of grazing;
- Perceived risk of detection by poachers;
- Crime patterns;
- Human activity/ settlements in proximity to target area;
- External policing or lack thereof;
- Availability of crime intelligence;
- Activity or criminal strongholds in precinct.

4.1. We can assume that if Mr van der Westhuizen keeps rhino on his property, a risk of poaching already exists.

4.2. The question we need to answer is : *Will development of Ikamva Lethu increase the risk and if so, to what extent?*

The factors mentioned above are not exhaustive, but it will play a pivotal role in the rhino security of Mr. van der Westhuizen's property, *whether Ikamva Lethu proceeds or not.*

Attorney Vosloo, on instruction of Mr. van der Westhuizen, tabled a concern that Ikamva Lethu staff members *may* increase the risk of poaching during the development phase *if they see rhino or exotic game*. Of the eighteen (18) factors influencing poaching, the fact that only one factor *may* change namely the possibility of Ikamva Lethu staff seeing rhino or exotic game does not automatically elevate the poaching risk.

For this specific factor to come into play and become relevant, the following elements must manifest:

- a) We must assume that some Ikamva Lethu employees/ contractors are criminally inclined;
- b) Have access to instruments to poach namely rifle, ammunition, etc.;
- c) Have opportunity i.e. access to the property where rhino/ game are kept;
- d) Have motive;
- e) Be reasonably sure that their actions will go unnoticed or undetected.

One cannot unequivocally reason or deduct, neither inductive nor deductive that if workers see rhino or exotic game that they will steal, hunt or harm the animals. To do so would be anecdotal.

5. OBSERVATIONS

During a site visit, it could be established that:

- a) There are two (2) fence lines of the proposed Ikamva Lethu development which borders Mr. van der Westhuizen's property. The fence line bordering farm 4/ 632 is approximately 1.6km and the fence line bordering farm 83/ 558 approximately 1.1km. **The fence impact under review, therefore, relates to 2.7km.**
- b) Two (2) hunting towers were observed. Both situated a few hundred meters (could be around 600m, but stand to be corrected) from both the fence lines as described above.
- c) Vegetation on Ikamva Lethu is such that Mr. van der Westhuizen's fence line is invisible 90% of the time if viewed from 200m away from the fence line. There is at least one (1) place where Mr. van der Westhuizen's fence line is visible from approximately 300 meters, but with plain unaided eyesight the view is tainted.
- d) Topographically Ikamva Lethu is lower and sloping away from Mr. van der Westhuizen property as correctly stated by Attorney Vosloo. This fact makes it hard and mostly impossible to see Mr. van der Westhuizen's property from 200m away.
- e) No rhino, rhino middens or waterholes could be seen near the mentioned fences.

6. THE HUMAN FACTOR

It is of vital importance to be mindful that **no employees will be living on the north-western portion of Ikamva Lethu**. The fact that employees will have no after hour access to the concerned communal area with Mr. van der Westhuizen, largely eliminates opportunity for employees to get up to mischief.

It is foreseen that local contractors and community will be utilized as the workforce during both the development and production phases of Ikamva Lethu.

The workforce will be *managed* and closely *supervised* which will further minimize security risk, if any.

It can be argued that it is local knowledge that Mr. van der Westhuizen keeps rhino and exotic animals, *therefore, it would not be new information to any local workforce*.

A workforce, and specifically its propensity to commit crime, can however be managed with confidence by skilled security and human resource staff. Dynamic and static factors amongst staff and contractors, both internal and external can be successfully monitored, mitigated and managed.

It is estimated that 62 seasonal employment opportunities and 10 permanent administrative opportunities will be created by the proposed project. It is proposed that a maximum of 5 permanent employees are housed within existing buildings south of the MR040070 which bisects the proposed Ikamva Lethu development. The 10-administrative staff will be accommodated during work hours, 08h00 to 17h00, within existing structures on a central portion of Ikamva Lethu, south of the MR040070. The closest existing structure proposed to accommodate staff (administrative) is approximately 1.5km east of the closest boundary of Mr van der Westhuizen's property, Farm 4/ 632.

Seasonal and project workforce do bring about an increased security risk in the form of predominantly socio-economic contact crimes. A responsible employer can, however, with relative ease proactively address any challenge in this regard by supplying proper living arrangements, social support and recreation facilities, for employees living on the site, as outlined above.

The 62-seasonal staff will be *transported to and from the farm daily* leaving no staff on the **north-western** portion of Ikamva Lethu during the evening when poaching crime mostly occur.

7. **STRAY BULLETS (Paragraph 3)**

Attorney Vosloo on behalf of Mr. van der Westhuizen did not indicate the exact location of the two (2) shooting ranges and the distance thereof from the two (2) Ikamva Lethu fences. Vital details regarding the shot direction (layout) of the two (2) shooting ranges were also not supplied. If the shot direction of the ranges is not in the direction of the Ikamva Lethu fences the matter should rest.

Quoting Attorney Vosloo “every reasonable possibility exists that a bullet may travel over the boundary in the direction of the development, causing potential damage, injury or even death to people.” If this is currently the case (bullets entering Ikamva Lethu), the author urgently and seriously proposes that such practice should cease with immediate effect.

The mere fact that foresight or possibility of stray bullets is now documented, is however comforting.

8. **SECURITY PROPOSAL**

Buffer Zone

The buffer zone adjacent to Mr van der Westhuizen’s property (Farm 4/632 and 83/558), which has been determined as a result of biodiversity constraints (e.g. soil suitability, vegetation conservation, aquatic buffers) will serve as an adequate early detection zone (EDZ) and in addition will hinder sight into Mr. van der Westhuizen’s property. In line with the biodiversity constraints this buffer zone will be at a minimum of 300m wide. The natural vegetation and topography on or near the communal boundaries with Mr. van der Westhuizen’s property forms a virtual buffer zone.

While it is not a required recommendation of this report to erect additional fences, it is noted that Ikamva Lethu will fence in the developed portion of their site in order to secure their product.

The buffer zone will not be implemented as a precaution against stray bullets as that should and must never happen.

In line with the biodiversity constraints and recommendations of the various specialists, access to the buffer zone should be restricted. Warning signs should be strategically posted on the inner perimeter of proposed buffer zone to indicate to staff that access to this area is restricted.

- **WARNING: Authorised Personnel Only, Biodiversity Conservation Area.**



Google earth photo depicting natural buffer zone at farm in vicinity



A similar small buffer zone visible on the western fence line of Mr. van der Westhuizen

9. **SECURITY STRATEGY – IKAMVA LETHU**

Goal – To manage and minimize all security threats during the development and production phase of Ikamva Lethu.

10. **SECURITY STRATEGY PROPOSAL**

	ACTION STEPS	IMPLEMENTATION DATE
1.	Vetting of all new employees/ contractors.	Prior to commencement of employment – September 2018 – Phase 1
1.1.	All new employees to complete pre-employment security questionnaire.	To be repeated with new employees/ contractors. March 2019
1.1.1.	Questionnaire processing and capturing on database. Filing of identity document copies.	Sept 2019 Jan 2020 Phase 2
1.2.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Applicants with elevated risk profile to be identified pre- employment. • Criminal vetting 	Aug 2019 March 2020 Sept 2020 Jan 2021
2.	Security induction meeting with all new employees/ contractors and sign-off of induction.	1 October 2018 for Phase 1 and thereafter to any new group commencing employment.
2.1.	Hard copy of Ikamva Lethu site security procedure issued to every employee/contractor.	
3.	Random visible security presence in buffer zone. At least once a week including sweeping operations of fence for snaring and signs of human activity.	Commence October 2018

	ACTION STEPS	IMPLEMENTATION DATE
4.	Enhanced/ elevated communication with security providers and plug into existing crime information systems and pre-warning alerts with regards to poaching suspect activity/ movement.	From commencement of development
5.	Any security breach/ compromise to be investigated swiftly and dealt with decisively.	As incidents occur
6.	Permanent on site – Security Supervisor with vehicle to facilitate and conduct abovementioned actions 1 – 5.	Commence October 2018